FHA: On Mortgage Insurance and Adverse Selection

Cato Institute reports:

According to a White House release, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which insures lenders’ against borrower default, will be lowering its annual premiums. While I believe this to be a reckless move in the wrong direction, I am the first to say that setting the appropriate premium is a lot harder than it looks.

The fundamental problem facing any insurer, like the FHA, is that the risk profile of borrowers is influenced by the premium rates they are charged. Obviously a rate that is set too low will not cover losses and the insurance fund will lose money. But a rate set too high will drive away low-risk borrowers and leave the insurer covering only high risk borrowers (and likely also losing money). An insurance fund can easily find itself in a position where it needs to raise rates to cover losses from risky borrowers, but each rate increase only drives out the good borrowers, making the risk composition of the pool ever worse.

The Obama regime wants to avoid market regulation of the housing market.